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ALWAYS UNDER LAW? 
Frank 1 Michelman* 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay is adapted, with some stylistic and organizational 
but little material change, from my Dewey Lecture entitled "Lay-
ers of Law," given at the University of Minnesota Law School on 
November 14, 1994.t In a prior work, I had argued that one can-
not cleave wholeheartedly and simultaneously to both of the two 
ideal notions of higher law and popular sovereignty, without con-
ceiving that the popular sovereign conducts its higher lawmaking 
in a normative spirit that I called jurisgenerative.z I began the 
present work with an aim of turning the previous argument 
around. Agreeing with the many who assign to the notion of 
popular sovereignty, as that notion figures in constitutional-dem-
ocratic political thought, an evocative or idealizing or quasi-
mythical status, I wanted to suggest something about this no-
tion's function in our political thought. Although "popular sov-
ereignty" is perhaps more often taken to express the idea that the 
people have the right to make the law be whatever in fact they 
decide, no further questions asked, I wanted to suggest that this 
notion's deeper signification is the expression of a wish to believe 
something opposite: that whoever at any time actually does lay 
* Robert Walmsley Professor of Law, Harvard University. Copyright© 1995 by 
Frank I. Michelman. 
1. This remains an exploratory and speculative piece, in keeping with the spirit of 
this journal. Under advice (let us call it) from the editors, I have held footnote citations 
to the barest minimum. Nevertheless, I owe many intellectual debts, including but cer-
tainly not limited to Pierre Schlag and Steven Wmter for both their published writings 
and their comments on this draft; to Frank Goodman, Samuel Freeman, Heidi Hurd, and 
Howard Lesnick for comments at and following a workshop session at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; to Martin Flaherty and James Fleming for comments on a pre-
vious draft; and to various contributors to Sanford Levinson's recent collection of essays 
on higher lawmaking (which I've been studying closely in a course I am currently teach-
ing), Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Con-
stitutional Amendment (Princeton U. Press, 1995); and to students in that course. To 
several trenchant commentators at the N.Y.U. Colloquium on Constitutional Theory and 
at a discussion sponsored by the editors of the journal Constellotions, I wish to say that 
there was not time to make this piece reflect what I learned from our sessions before it 
had to go to press. This work is not finished yet. 
2. Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, rrJ Yale LJ. 1493, 1499-1503 (1988). 
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down higher law to the country does so in a spirit of answering to 
some commonly and publicly perceived or commonly and pub-
licly derivable standard of right.3 I don't know whether the essay 
as it now stands delivers on the stated aim. In the final section, 
added after I gave the lecture, the argument takes a tum I hadn't 
at all anticipated when I began. 
I. THE THESIS STATED 
How do we think our scheme of government is justified? 
This is not a simple question, at least not as I intend it, and I 
have to begin by explaining what I mean by it. 
Start with the phrase "our scheme of government." By this I 
mean something quite broadly defined, roughly what John Rawls 
seems to mean when he speaks of constitutional democracy.4 I 
shall use that term, and I shall mean by it our familiar broad 
model of a liberal-individualist political order based on higher 
law, representative government, and popular sovereignty. That's 
not as innocuous as you might think, though, for I mean "consti-
tutional democracy" to signify commitment in full earnest to all 
three of those familiar defining terms. And it may strike you, as 
I thus lay them down-as very likely it has struck you before-
that these three commonplace terms of the constitutional-demo-
cratic confession are not self-evidently harmonious. "Higher 
law" seems in some way to stand against both popular sover-
eignty and representative government. As for the latter pair, 
"popular sovereignty" speaks of government not only for the 
people but by them, and that is not obviously the same thing as 
government of them by officials or representatives. Sorting out 
some of the relations among these regulative notions, especially 
those between higher law and popular sovereignty, while trying 
always to keep faith with each as regulative, will be a part of my 
business here. 
I approach this sorting out though the question I've already 
put: How do we think constitutional-democratic government is 
justified? Now, you might say right off, maybe not everyone 
3. Needless, I hope, to add: The sight of someone expressing through myth a wish 
or belief in something's being the case is most definitely not a sign that the ideal some-
thing is the case or even is believed to be. It could well be the converse: a sign of suspi-
cion and concern that it isn't and perhaps can't ever be quite so. Nevertheless, one might 
question whether indulgence in the quasi-mythology of popular sovereignty, with its inev-
itable insinuation (as I believe) of an existent fact of morally responsible government, is 
an altogether healthy way for a country to express a sense either of political ideals or of 
performative shortfall from them. 
4. John Rawls, Political Liberalism xvi, xviii & passim (Colum. U. Press, 1993). 
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thinks it is; so who is this "we" of whom I speak so complacently? 
I could give you the innocuous, the disarming response. I could 
say that in speaking here of "we" I just mean whoever reading 
this does in fact incline to the belief that constitutional democ-
racy is probably the right (or, if you prefer, the best) broad 
model for a scheme of government for their society. But actually 
I intend something a little more contentious. I say "we" sus-
pecting that you, reader, at least some of the time, believe in the 
probable rightness (or best-ness), for your society, of constitu-
tional democracy in some recognizable form (although perhaps 
not exactly the form in which it's currently prescribed and prac-
ticed in your country).s 
So ... How do you think-how do we think-constitutional 
democracy is justified? In casting this in terms of "how do we 
think," I'm not intending to pose an issue in normative political 
theory. I'm not inviting answers of the form: a substantively suf-
ficient justification of constitutional democracy is (say) the argu-
ment set forth by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.6 I'm 
intending rather to pose a question about facts of constitutional-
democratic thought-about how, in fact, we think about govern-
ment, bearing in mind that one fact about how we think about it 
could very well be this: that we think about it in ways that are 
themselves counterfactual-idealizing, imaginative, utopian-
maybe more so than we usually notice or admit. Accordingly, 
the inquiry here is meant as descriptive, not prescriptive. Its 
form is that of exposition. It is an effort to catch hold of, to look 
into, habitual thoughtways and conceptualizations that enter qui-
etly and unselfconsciously, but also perhaps problematically, into 
people's largely unexamined convictions that constitutional de-
mocracy is an apt broad model for schemes of political justice for 
a society of beings conditioned and situated as we every-daily 
think we are. 
I'll begin by proposing a thesis in this expositive vein (one 
that standing by itself may not seem very surprising) that we can 
call the always-under-law thesis. In order to set forth the thesis, I 
need to stipulate a couple of definitions. Let us, therefore, un-
derstand "constitutional essentials" (I draw the term from John 
Rawls) to mean legal provisions for the structure and process of 
5. I expect it will tum out for some readers that you will start to think, as you work 
your way through what follows, that you are not a constitutional democrat in my sense, 
because you find me taking too much in earnest either the popular-sovereignty or the 
higher-law commitment posed by the model. Nevertheless, I ask you: Are you really 
prepared to subordinate either of those commitments to the other? 
6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, 1971). 
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government-votes and elections, allocations of powers among 
branches and offices, and so forth-and also for limitations upon 
government, for "rights and liberties of citizenship that [govern-
ment is] bound to respect."7 And let us, further, define "higher 
lawmaking" as any of (i) legislation of a country's scheme of con-
stitutional essentials,s or (ii) legislation of standards to govern 
type (i) lawmaking, or (iii) legislation of standards to govern type 
(ii) lawmaking, or (iv) ... etc. ad inf (So type (n) lawmaking is 
always "higher" than type (n-1).) Then the expositive "always-
under-law thesis" is this: Constitutional-democratic thought is al-
ways taking for granted that whoever is engaged in higher law-
making for a country (and I don't care how high up the (n)s you 
want to go) is, in that engagement, answering to some still higher 
law that is already there, in place; for every (n) there is an (n+l). 
Constitutional democrats take this for granted insomuch as (a) 
we think that only if it's so can our scheme of government be 
justified, and (b) we think our scheme of government is justified. 
In constitutional-democratic political thought, then, higher 
lawmaking is a matter of law-all-the-way-up. Despite that titillat-
ingly paradoxical formulation, though, the always-under-law-the-
sis may very well be renderable in a way that makes it 
unsurprising. Consider a body of thought that posits a set of ab-
stract, universal, human ("natural") rights, such that a scheme of 
constitutional essentials that fails to secure these is, in this body 
of thought, ipso facto unjustified. The always-under-law thesis 
can, I think, be shown to hold for this body of thought.9 But this 
is a common form of constitutionalist thought. So why be sur-
prised at the thesis? 
It is we democratic constitutionalists-we consitutional dem-
ocrats-for whom the thesis is problematic. For us, while higher 
7. Rawls, Political Liberalism at 227 (cited in note 4). 
8. We could perhaps better define type (i) higher lawmaking as that which is ad-
dressed to the slightly broader domain that Rawls calls political "fundamentals," see id. at 
214-15, which takes in, in addition to constitutional essentials, "questions of basic [distrib-
utive] justice," see id. at 214, 228-29, but this refinement is unnecessary for our purposes 
here. 
9. As applied to it, the thesis could mean something like this: The ledger of ab-
stract-universal natural rights is underdetenninative for concrete schemes of constitu-
tional essentials because, depending on local historical, cultural, etc. conditions, there are 
various such schemes that can satisfy this (natural-right-fulfilling) criterion of justification. 
But this is true, as well, for intermediate sets of standards (still locally variant but decreas-
ingly so) to govern selection among concrete constitutional schemes, or (moving up the 
scale of abstraction-universality) for selecting among more locally variant, less abstract-
universal, sets of standards. At higher and higher levels, these increasingly abstract-uni-
versal sets of standards (to govern selection among lower-level sets of standards) ap-
proach asymptotically, without ever reaching, the ultimate abstract-universal-the at-the-
last ineffably abstract and universal-ledger of natural rights. 
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law may be a regulative notion, no less so is popular sovereignty. 
And the always-under-law thesis is paradoxical when extended, 
as I'm going to insist constitutional-democratic thought has to do, 
to the case of higher lawmaking by a sovereign people. In fact, 
the result of this extension is a double, a two-faced paradox: a 
contradiction of the sovereign character of the self-governing 
people combined with a contradiction of the politics-tran-
scending character of the higher law. 
We commonly take the idea of the sovereignty of the people 
to imply that the collective will of the governed (somehow-or-
other gauged and expressed) strictly constitutes the highest law of 
the state. Popular sovereignty, in other words, we commonly take 
to imply that the people acting to resolve their country's higher 
law cannot then themselves be acting under the sign of law. The 
people's sovereign act of higher lawmaking law must itself, as 
sovereign, be above and beyond all law. That, I say, is how we 
usually think we think about popular sovereignty. The always-
under-law thesis, however, contradicts this ordinarily unreflective 
take on how participants in constitutional democracy think about 
the provenance of higher law. Part III of this essay is meant to 
show that constitutional democrats conceive higher lawmaking to 
be always under law, even when the higher lawmakers are the 
people themselves. At the same time, though, and correlatively, 
the exposition shows that, in constitutional-democratic thought, 
the law that even the highest politics is under is itself a politically 
immanent creation, not a deliverance of transcendent, trans-
political reason. 
The exposition will carry us into some familiar puzzles about 
who or what we have in view when speaking of a sovereign "Peo-
ple." Few, after all, would defend literally the proposition that 
the terms of government are ever actually set by an active, ex-
press, affirmative consensus of the entirety of a country's politi-
cally franchised population. One needn't dismiss popular 
sovereignty as a fiat-out lie (and I wouldn't) in order to see that 
this can hardly be a term of scientific description of real-world 
politics. Popular sovereignty is surely in some part a mythic idea, 
one whose function is as much evocative or expressive as it is 
descriptive. 
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II. FROM POLIDCAL JUSTIFICATION TO 
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 
A. JUSTIFICATION 
What we're trying to do here is to have a look at ourselves 
thinking, when what we're thinking about is how a certain some-
thing is justified. What that something is we'll soon be discuss-
ing, but perhaps we had first better ask: But what is 
"justification," anyway? All I mean by the term is something 
aptly said in response to complaint. Look at it this way: No mat-
ter who we are, we inevitably from time to time experience gov-
ernment as an external force, an intervention in our lives. So 
there is always and everywhere the potential for complaint 
against government. Justification is what can be said to allay 
such complaint, actual or potential. Constitutional democrats 
think we can often allay complaints against specific acts of gov-
ernment by showing how these issued properly from a scheme of 
government-a scheme of constitutional essentials-that itself 
measures up to a set of general normative requirements for 
schemes of this kind. 
B. HIGHER LAW 
In what I just wrote, you see in action one of the typical 
arrangings of constitutional-democratic political thought. This 
thought-our thought-arranges acts of political ordering in a 
two-place hierarchy. In the first place, there are schemes of gov-
ernment ("constitutions"). In the second place there are (issuing 
from the constitution in force), "ordinary" political acts of legis-
lation, administration, and adjudication.lo 
Expectant upon any detection of an intentional act of polit-
ical ordering is a question of justification. Constitutional-demo-
cratic thought divides the question of justification for enactment 
of a scheme of government from that of justification for any 
subordinate, ordinary governmental act. Suppose we say that to 
justify directly a political act is to show the correspondence of this 
very act (not just some higher-level act that authorized this one) 
to ideals of justice or conduciveness to general human goods.u 
10. Of course a constitutional scheme may prescribe hierarchical orderings among 
the varieties of ordinary acts it authorizes and organizes, but these subordinate hierar-
chies need not concern us here. 
11. I'm trying to stay noncommittal here as between deontological and consequen-
tialist modalities of political-moral evaluation. A higher-law scheme's expected conse-
quences bear on its (dis)justification just insofar as one's moral view makes the 
consequences count for evaluations of this kind. 
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In constitutional-democratic political thought, demands for di-
rect justification are principally directed to the scheme of consti-
tutional essentials; "ordinary" acts of government we are usually 
content to justify indirectly, by verifying that they have issued 
properly from an accepted scheme of constitutional essentials.t2 
We may think a particular tax, for example, is bad policy or even 
in some degree unjust; but if the tax was imposed by a law issuing 
properly from an accepted scheme of constitutional essentials, 
then we accept coercive collection of the tax as (at least prima 
facie) justified. We allow the governmental product to inherit 
justification from a supposedly justified constitutional scheme.t3 
"Higher lawmaking" in these pages means lawmaking ad-
dressed to the scheme of constitutional essentials, the scheme 
whose justified character (supposing it has one) is thought to be 
inheritable by specific acts of government that issue from it. It is 
specifically this kind of higher lawmaking action that, I claim, 
constitutional-democratic thought must treat as always directly 
answering to some pre-existing, publicly ascertainable (and also, 
as matters will develop, politically grounded or immanent) stan-
dard of right or good. Which claim is, of course, the nub of my 
answer to the question I posed at the beginning: How do we 
think our scheme of government is justified? 
C. REASONS OF THE GOVERNED 
I have to say something, now, about how constitutional-
democratic thought tends to approach the question of standards 
of rightness and goodness for higher-law schemes. So consider 
this: Sometimes (not all of the time, I hope for your sake) your 
thoughts may tum to questions of the justifiability of basic polit-
ical arrangements, schemes of constitutional essentials. At those 
times, I expect, you see your social world as populated by per-
12. I say "principally" and "usually" because there's also in this thought the sense 
that a scheme of constitutional essentials may itself call-and perhaps, in order to be 
itself justified, it must call-for direct moral justification of certain classes of specific acts 
of government. For example, it's widely held that among the regnant American constitu-
tional essentials is a requirement that the enacted procedures leading to certain kinds of 
deprivations be fundamentally fair. The point is that we don't think schemes of constitu-
tional essentials must, in order to be justified, always or sweepingly impose such require-
ments and when they don't it's to their own putatively justified character that we look to 
justify the concrete acts that issue from them. (For example, this is how most American 
observers have been recently accustomed to treat most aspects of legislation dealing with 
labor relations, trade regulation, and taxation.) 
13. This duality of scheme and product bears comparison with other big dualisms 
that are recurrent in liberal political thought: process versus substance, the right versus 
the good, law versus politics, constitutional (or deliberative) versus ordinary (or strategic) 
politics. 
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sons who are conscious and regardful of themselves both as indi-
viduals and as what philosophers call "subjects." This means you 
then see yourself and others as individuals severally possessed of 
minds and lives of their own and severally possessed, further-
more, of worthwhile (not to say supremely worthwhile) capaci-
ties for taking some substantial degree of charge of their own 
minds and lives, making and pursuing their own judgments about 
what to do, what to strive for, what is good, and what is right. 
These attributions to persons of individualized self-possession 
and subjectivity are certainly challengeable. It's not hard in our 
age to stir up philosophic or psychoanalytic or social-theoretic 
doubts about them. These doubts, however, do not usually seem 
to stop most of us from making precisely such attributions, virtu-
ally automatically, at the times when we are thinking practically 
about matters of political justice.t4 
It seems to me clear, at any rate, that a view of persons as 
individual subjects strongly shapes constitutional-democratic 
thought about constitutional justification. This view of persons 
prompts a certain sense of what it must mean to defend against 
imaginable complaint the intrusions and constraints of govern-
ment in people's lives. Justification then must include, at a mini-
mum, a showing that all of the affected subjects-all of the 
persons subject to the range of governmental actions in ques-
tion-have what are actually, for them (whether they appreciate 
this at the moment or not), good reasons to consent to the 
scheme of constitutional essentials from which the actions issue. 
I intend what I've said to this point as a rather modest and 
unsurprising claim about the form of constitutional-democratic 
political thought. I've so far said only that, for each of us (qua 
constitutional democrat), a minimum condition for higher law 
justification is our own readiness to attribute to all affected sub-
jects a set of reasons for consent to the scheme of government 
that we somehow manage to see as both "theirs" and "good." 
This sense that schemes of constitutional essentials are justifiable 
only by appeal to reasons aptly attributable to all affected per-
sons is, I am saying, deeply present in constitutional-democratic 
political thought. I am going to call this the demand for justifica-
tion by reasons-of-the-governed. 
14. I'm speaking here, as many will doubtless see, of what John Rawls calls a polit-
ical conception of justice and the person. See Rawls, Polilh:al Liberalism at 11-22, 29-35 
(cited in note 4). Whether there are good grounds for resisting the impulse I describe, or 
for regarding it as pathological, is beside the point of this essay. See Frank I. Michelman, 
The Subject of Liberalism (book review), 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1807, 1809-10 (1994) (briefly 
describing controversy over this matter). 
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Justification by reasons-of-the-governed is a relatively weak 
demand-at least by comparison with a further justificatory de-
mand, for government under law, which I am about to claim is 
also a fixture in constitutional-democratic political thought. Get-
ting clear the difference between the two demands is the next 
step in my exposition. 
D. GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 
Imagine, if you will, a country governed by officials organ-
ized as legislative assemblies, executive agencies, and courts of 
law. Acts of government by these officials can frequently have 
important, shaping impacts on the operative content of the coun-
try's higher-law scheme of constitutional essentials. Official acts 
may resolve what had theretofore been open or contested ques-
tions regarding that operative content, or they may in some other 
way help redetermine or modify that content. 
It will help to have before us an illustrative higher-law con-
troversy to which we can refer from time to time, preferably one 
with which everyone is thoroughly familiar. So go back with me 
to New Years Day, 1973, prior to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Roe v. Wade. As of that time, the question of constitutional 
protection (in any degree) for a woman's freedom to control the 
course of a pregnancy was by no means resolved in the affirma-
tive. It was an open question of higher law, in the clear sense 
that respectable arguments appealing to higher law principle and 
precedent were available to presumptively sincere contestants on 
both sides. 
This then-open question of higher law might conceivably 
have been resolved by a formal constitutional amendment, en-
acted by supermajorities of Congress and state legislatures as 
provided by Article V of the Constitution-for example, a 
"human life" amendment declaring a fetus from the moment of 
conception to be a constitutionally cognizable "person." Most of 
us allow, though, that inevitably there are other avenues than 
formal amendment to resolutions of many open or contested 
questions of higher-law meanings. We see, in fact, how the con-
cretely operative scheme of constitutional essentials undergoes 
some degree of redetermination or modification whenever, as 
frequently happens, judges or other public officials have occasion 
to interpret the scheme in the course of carrying out their duties 
under it. Which, of course, is what rather dramatically happened 
in a series of decisions by the Supreme Court running from, let us 
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say, Griswold v. Connecticutts to Planned Parenthood v. Caseyt6; 
a series which, by the prevailing account in Casey, has now made 
it settled higher law in this country-a settled component of our 
operative scheme of constitutional essentials-that women's 
freedom of reproductive choice during pregnancy enjoys a cer-
tain measure of protection against government. 
So we're focused now on the class of official acts by which 
office-holders (a class in which I include judges) resolve or mod-
ify the operative content of extant higher law. And I ask you 
now to suppose with me that whenever any member of any offi-
cial body commits one of these acts that has an effect of resolving 
or modifying the operative scheme of constitutional essentials, or 
contributes toward an act having such an effect (for example, by 
casting a vote), these officials always, each and every time, each 
and every one, act sincerely in accord with what they severally, 
just then, see as good reasons for consent attributable to all of 
the governed. 
But now suppose, further, that the reasons are disorganized, 
in the following way. The various officials don't always all con-
currently attribute the same set of underlying reasons for con-
sent. In fact, they can frequently be found attributing various 
different sets of reasons, having diverse and conflicting implica-
tions for contested questions of higher-law meaning and content. 
What is more, individual officials don't reliably attribute the 
same or even evidently consistent sets of reasons from one day to 
the next, from one official act to the next.17 
Whatever you might find worrisome about this sort of situa-
tion, it's not that any official is ever, on any given occasion, fail-
ing to cite plausible reasons-of-the-governed to justify his or her 
exercise of power. The problem is not a want of cited reasons but 
rather a surplus. This surplus of cited reasons defines the differ-
ence between the demand for justification by reasons-of-the-gov-
erned and the demand for government under law. 
15. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
16. 112 s. a. 2791 (1992). 
17. Constitutional lawyers are wearily familiar with such disorganization, but here is 
an illustration to convey the idea. Yesterday, Judge A voted to uphold against constitu-
tional challenge a law flatly prohibiting abortions. The judge reasoned that the law car-
ries out a commitment lying at the core of people's reasons for consent to the scheme of 
government, namely, to protect the powerless against abuse by the powerful. Today, 
Judge A rejects (or yesterday, Judge B rejected) a child's claim to a constitutional right to 
the government's protection against parental violence. The judge reasoned that granting 
the claim would contradict a commitment lying at the core of people's reasons for consent 
to the scheme of government, namely, to protect individual liberty and privacy against 
majoritarian oppression. 
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The demand for government under law is the demand for 
consistent regulation, by some public and unified set of durable, 
antecedently binding principles of justice and right, of all determi-
nations, interpretations, and resolutions of a political society's 
operative scheme of constitutional essentials. There is an evident 
logic behind this demand, and it flows once again from that mini-
mum condition for constitutional justification that I've previously 
laid before you: that is, attribution to all affected persons of a set 
of good reasons of their own for consent to the scheme of 
government. 
To see the logic, all you have to do is bear in mind two 
things: One, what has to be justified is something concrete: an 
actual, on-going scheme of constitutional essentials, an histori-
cally specific, coherently identifiable practice of government. 
1\vo, the "subjects" of this justification-the putative holders of 
reasons for consent-are similarly concrete; they are the living, 
breathing members of the population of the country, all of whom 
stand exposed to the powers authorized by this one, actually op-
erative scheme. Constitutional-democratic political justification 
must, then, concretely consist in establishment of a set of reasons 
why this people (these people)-in their conditions as they make 
them out given their ways of understanding self, freedom, soci-
ety, and value-can rationally see they have for submitting to the 
actual scheme in force over them.ts 
It is this concreteness of the demand for justification by rea-
sons-of-the-governed that explains the demand for a law for gov-
ernment to be under-meaning by "law" a set, a sensibly unified 
and consistent set, of public, durable, antecedently binding prin-
ciples to govern all determinations regarding the constitutional 
essentials. The demands for unity, publicity, durability, and 
antecedence-in a word, for lawness-are there because to per-
mit power-wielding officials to resolve or modify the constitu-
tional essentials on the fly (so to speak), free of obligation to 
conform their resolutions to a unified set of extant, publicly es-
tablished standards, would be, in effect, to set loose the exercise 
of governmental power from any actual set of reasons the actual 
people could really have for supporting the scheme of govern-
ment to which they are subject. 
18. I'm not here making an anti-unversalist, pro-particularist (historicist, relativist) 
claim. The argument holds regardless of what we say about the samenesses or differences 
among people(s) in the respects pertinent to judgments of the rightness or best-ness of a 
scheme of government for them. 
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In sum: For constitutional democrats, the moral defensibility 
of an actual practice of government must depend on conscious 
resolution within (or for) the sponsoring society of some set of 
enduring and contentful principles of constraint on govern-
ment-principles expressing the reasons that a people are sup-
posed to have for submitting to this scheme of government. 
These principles, then, will stand as fundamental-central, defin-
itive, constitutive-for the political order in question, the pledge 
of its morally justified character. What all this amounts to is that 
justified constitutional-democratic government must be govern-
ment "under law." 
III. THE SELF-GOVERNING PEOPLE 
At this stage of the exposition, the task is to face up as di-
rectly as we can to the fact, and its implications, that constitu-
tional democrats hold the notion of popular sovereignty-
government of the people by themselves-to be fully regulative 
for constitutional democracy, on a plane with the notion of 
higher law. This is what's so intriguing about constitutionalism of 
the democratic kind: how we try to maintain the demand that the 
government act under a higher law while at the same time always 
tying this higher law's validity to the democratic acts of a political 
society or "people." 
Part II traced a logical path from a demand for justification 
of government by reasons of the governed to a demand for gov-
ernment under law. Suppose, now, that we can also confirm 
something that I've already intimated (and that may seem highly 
plausible on its face): that the laying down to a country of a 
scheme of constitutional essentials is itself an act of government. 
At that point, if we safely reach it, we'll have established the al-
ways-under-law thesis. Won't we? 
For remember what the thesis is. The thesis is-to restate it 
verbatim-that it's a constant (if usually unspoken) premise in 
constitutional-democratic political thought that "whoever is en-
gaged in higher lawmaking for a country (and I don't care how 
high up the (n)s you want to go) is, in that engagement, answer-
ing to some still higher law that is already there, in place." And 
isn't that established if we've confirmed: (1) that the demand that 
government be under law is a constant in constitutional-demo-
cratic political thought, and (2) that acts of higher lawmaking are 
acts of government? 
But hang on a minute, you may say. The argument, you may 
say, runs into a special complication in the case we're consider-
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ing, by reason of the special identification in this case of the 
higher lawgiver with the people themselves. Prescription of 
higher law by a people to themselves, you may say, just is not the 
kind of act or event to which the logic of the demand for govern-
ment under law is applicable. 
After all, the reasons a people have or consider themselves 
to have for submitting to a scheme of government may not be 
fixed once and for all. It seems likelier that these would be 
changeable over time, in ways that would call for corresponding 
change in the operative scheme of constitutional essentials. Of 
course, it doesn't necessarily follow that it has to be the people 
themselves who decide when a change in their reasons requires 
change in their operative political constitution; self-government 
is a normative choice or ideal, not {politically speaking) a logical 
necessity.19 Deep democrats may demand to know who better-
who other-than the people themselves should or even can de-
termine when their reasons have changed, and in what ways, and 
what needs to be done by way of constitutional alteration to take 
due account of whatever change in reasons has occurred. But 
whatever one says about that question, there will remain a formi-
dable challenge to the claim for extension of the always-under-
law thesis to the case of higher lawmaking by the people them-
selves: Supposing, as popular-sovereignty theory calls us to do, 
that the decider of these questions about the people's reasons is 
the people themselves, are these not then matters of a sort that 
logically must be exempt from any "under law" requirement? 
The challenge is apt. The logical path we traced from "rea-
sons of the governed" to "always under law" does, indeed, seem 
to run out when the higher lawmakers are conceived to be the 
governed themselves. If, then, the always-under-law thesis does 
extend to this case of self-government by the people, it must do 
so for additional reasons. Now, additional reasons for making 
the extension do, in fact, exist. While it is arguable that such 
reasons are already contained in the very idea of self-govern-
ment,2o I want to take a somewhat different tack here and sug-
gest that they arise from the conceptual need to confer an 
identity on "the People" that is continuous across an event of 
higher lawmaking, leaving them the same People after as they 
19. Philosophically speaking is another matter: whether, for example, there can be 
(individual) freedom without (political, popular) self-government "all the way up." But 
that is not the chosen topic of this essay. 
20. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L 
Rev. 4, 25-27, 47 (1986). 
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were before the event. Without such a conferral of continuous 
identity, we cannot affirm popular sovereignty. 
Popular sovereignty signifies what Lincoln said (although he 
may not have meant his phrase in just our sense): government of 
the people not only for the people but by the people. It signifies 
self-government, the condition of a people living under a regime 
of higher law, of constitutional essentials, that they themselves 
make or adopt. Popular sovereignty, accordingly, conceives of 
higher lawmaking events as deliberate acts of a capital-P People 
legislating. 
What is more, the idea envisions a People legislating not 
only to the official agents-congresses, presidents, courts-
whom they constitute by their higher lawmaking acts, but to 
themselves as the self-same (self-governing) People as those who 
legislate. This point-that the People sovereignly conceived as 
giving law must be identically and therefore sovereignly con-
ceived as taking law-is crucial to the exposition, so I'm going to 
pause over it for a moment. 
A People legislating a constitution legislate to themselves, 
qua People. They do so at least insomuch as every constitution 
(worthy of the name) is a law containing a binding rule about 
how itself (including the rule of which we just now speak) may be 
revised. In the Constitution of the United States, this rule-sav-
ing the views of the Yale non-exclusivistS2t-is Article V, requir-
ing (in several alternative permutations) concurrent 
supermajorities of both houses of Congress to propose an 
amendment, or of the states to instigate a convention for propos-
ing amendments, and then a supermajority of state legislatures or 
ratifying conventions to ratify a proposed amendment. Appar-
ently, then, there is a dimension of political freedom that we both 
attribute to the chartering People (represented as the authors 
and ratifiers of Article V) and deny to the People as thus 
chartered-that is, the freedom to decide upon procedures of 
higher lawmaking. The charterers ("We the People of the United 
States") seem to stand, then, on a different plane of authority 
from the chartered ("our posterity"), as creators to creatures. 
How is it possible to construe such an event as one of self-
government? 
There are possibility conditions for this, I now want to sug-
gest, but they are stringent. For a People to be self-governing 
21. See, e.g., Bruce Ackennan, Higher Lawmaking, in Levinson, Responding to Im-
perfection at 63 (cited in note 1); Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutionalism in the United States: 
From Theory to Politics in id. at 89. 
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means for them to legislate to themselves as the self-same People 
as those who legislate. This means that the lawmaking act ema-
nates from a People whose collective character or "political iden-
tity" (to use Bruce Ackerman's nice term) not only continues 
through the process of enactment undissolved and self-identical 
but also, by the same token, pre-exists the process.22 
We need to say, then, what it is we think confers political 
identities on empirical human aggregates, identities of a sort that 
allows us to check for the sameness of the identities of the People 
who lay down constitutional law and the People to whom it is 
laid down. What do we think this people-constituting, identity-
fixing factor could possibly be? Must it not finally come down to 
an attitude of expectation or commitment shared by constituent 
members of the putative capital-P People? Of expectation of the 
presence among them of some substantially contentful normative 
like-mindedness, or at the very least of commitment to searching 
out the possibility of this? An expectation of, or commitment to, 
some cultural or dispositional or experiential commonality from 
which they can together try to distill some substantially con-
tentful idea of political reason or right? 
Think, now, about how matters look from the standpoint of 
the People on the downstream side, so to speak, of an event of 
higher lawmaking. As a self-governing people, they cannot ac-
cept law from anyone save ... themselves. But it seems they can 
know themselves as themselves-can know themselves as, so to 
speak, a collective political self-only by knowing themselves as 
a group of sharers, joint participants in some already present, 
contentful idea, or proto-idea, of political reason or right. This 
means they can know their lawgivers as legitimate-as sharing 
political identity with them-only through the lawgivers' per-
ceived or supposed participation in some political-regulative idea 
that's sufficiently distinct to be identifiable-identifiable, that is, 
as the same one as theirs. What we're saying here, in effect, is 
that a population's conception of itself as self-governing, as legis-
lating law to itself, depends on its sense of its members as, in their 
higher lawmaking acts, commonly and constantly inspired by and 
aspiring to some distinct regulative idea of political justice and 
right, but an idea that itself has sprung from the politics of the 
self-same self-governing People. 
22. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 204 (Belknap Press, 1991). 
~ckennan writes, it seems to me paradoxically, of "an entire People ... break[ing] with 
Its past, and construct[ing] a new political identity for itself." 
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What I believe has now been established is this. Constitu-
tional democrats attribute higher lawmaking to "the People 
themselves,"23 conceived as self-governing; and it's precisely be-
cause they do so that they cannot ever conceive higher lawmak-
ing either as total revolution or as writing on a clean slate. To 
put the matter in a somewhat different way: Higher lawmaking is 
always, in constitutional-democratic concept, a product of a 
framed political interaction, an interaction framed by some al-
ready present, politically grounded, idea of political reason or 
right. 
IV. THE PEOPLE'S COURT 
Let us now ask: Is this political-normative idea that constitu-
tional democrats can't help thinking must frame and regulate 
every Gustified) event of higher lawmaking by the People prop-
erly called an instance of law? We approach the question indi-
rectly, by noticing that a "yes" answer carries with it certain odd-
looking implications, and then to trying to figure out how we 
might be able to make sufficient sense of these implications to 
entertain seriously the premise from which they spring. 
To start to see what these odd-looking implications are, we 
can recur to our illustrative case. The scheme of American con-
stitutional essentials operative today protects some measure of 
freedom on a pregnant woman's part to control her pregnancy. 
This is now a settled component of the scheme, at least according 
to the prevailing view in Casey. Imagine, now, a reversal of this 
component by a so-called "human life" constitutional amend-
ment, duly enacted by one of the procedures provided by Article 
V of the Constitution. Since a part of our business here is com-
ing to terms with the idea of popular sovereignty, we shall regard 
the amendment, as that idea requires, as undoubtedly an act of 
the People themselves. 
Suppose, now, that we give the name "law" to the political-
normative idea that (according to my foregoing exposition) con-
stitutional democrats think must be there, in place, to regulate 
every instance of higher lawmaking by the People. Then it seems 
we would have to regard our human life amendment as not only 
an expression of the People's legislative will but as also, at the 
same time, the People's rendition of something like a judgment 
23. See The Federalist No. 40; Ackerman, We the People at 177-78, 192 (cited in note 
22). 
1995] ALWAYS UNDER LAW 243 
at law.24 This conjunction of legislation and adjudication is unu-
sual, but is it unthinkable? Could we not see the higher-law en-
actment-the constitutional amendment-issuing as a kind of 
remedy from a legal decision, bound and determined by legal ar-
gument presented to the People's court? 
There immediately appears a fairly glaring trouble with this 
construction of the case, which we can present in terms provided 
by Bruce Ackerman. The amendment would plainly be meant as 
an alteration in the country's concretely operative scheme of 
higher law, a reversal of the Casey settlement. The amendment 
would furthermore have, at least potentially, a palpable degree 
of the quality that Ackerman calls transformative. Its seismic ef-
fects across a broad swathe of the higher law could tum out to be 
considerable. Now, "transformation" is a brave term-one well 
suited, one might say, to sovereignty. "Transformation" insinu-
ates, in Ackerman's language, a "radical break" from the polit-
ical past, a "drastic change," a new beginning.25 
But according to Ackerman and many others, legal argu-
ments are demands for fidelity to a political past-meaning, 
wherever and insofar as the People are supposed sovereign, fidel-
ity to the past lawmaking acts of the People.z6 The paradigmatic 
addressee of a legal argument is a court staffed by judges, and 
judges in popular-sovereignty theory are agents of the People 
whose special trust is "preservation" of the People's past higher 
lawmaking. (Just ask Alexander Hamiltonz1 or John Marshallzs.) 
On these terms, it would seem, there cannot be such a thing as a 
24. There surely is some affinity between John Rawls's notion of public reason, see 
Rawls, Polilical Liberalism Lecture VI at 212-54 (cited in note 4}, and the notion I'm 
exploring here of a politically grounded "law" that (I say} constitutional democracy sup-
poses higher lawmaking by the People to be always under. A friend who read this asked 
whether there's any conflict between Rawls's remark that the restraints or obligations of 
public reason are not a matter of law (see id. at 213), and my suggestion that the higher-
lawmaking People are supposed to be rendering something like a judgment at law. I 
don't think so. Rawls means to say, I believe, that there is no positive legal obligation on 
citizens to judge public questions by and only by the light of public reason; public reason 
is "an ideal conception of citizenship," id., not a subsisting legal obligation. There is noth-
ing to the contrary in my unfolding account of constitutional democratic political thought. 
According to my account, it's not (in this thought} a matter of subsisting legal duty that 
the People treat questions of the constitutional essentials as matters of judgment under a 
standard; it's rather a (very possibly counterfactual} presupposition of the idea of the 
justified character of the governmental order. 
25. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People at 204-05 (cited in note 22}. 
26. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constilution, 
93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1053, 1070-71 (1984}. 
'2:7. See The Federalist No. 78. 
28. See Marbury v. Madis_on. 
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legal argument to justify potentially transformative higher law 
changes. 
Do we move too fast? Here is one possibility I suppose we 
ought to consider: Perhaps it's both conceivable and acceptable 
for a legal argument to aim at a transformative result, even un-
derstanding legality as fidelity to popular sovereignty, as long as 
the addressees of the argument-the judges in the case (so to 
speak)-are the People themselves and not their subordinate ju-
dicial agents. But that would still leave the question of what it 
would mean, then, to call the motivating argument a legal one. 
What analogy, what noteworthy similarity, would we be perceiv-
ing between judicial decision in a constitutional case and the 
higher-law resolutions of the People themselves? 
Apparently, the noteworthy similarity would have to be that 
both judicial decision and popular higher lawmaking are ideally 
meant to depend upon exercises of judgment according to an as-
certainable, politically grounded standard of right. Now, one 
might suggest that a name for a publicly ascertainable, politically 
pedigreed standard of right to govern debate over what is now to 
be done politically is law; and argument appealing to such a stan-
dard would, then, be legal argument. 
But of course this doesn't resolve our difficulty, it only re-
states it. The difficulty comes in trying to attribute to a single act 
of higher lawmaking the two properties of fidelity (legality) and 
freedom (transformativity). If by calling the act a legal one we 
mean it is to be approached and construed as a collective exercise 
of judgment under a pre-existent governing standard that's some-
how already politically endorsed as a part of the higher law, then 
to speak in the same breath of transformation-or even, more 
modestly, alteration or change-is to fail to report with precision 
what is going on. Isn't it? 
Well, perhaps not. Perhaps not, if we understand "transfor-
mation" in a relative sense. It is relative to what I'll call the 
"layer" of constitutional law that's operative at any given mo-
ment for the practices of officials and citizens. For we've now 
begun, in effect, to think of constitutional law as multi-layered, as 
itself containing relatively "lower" and "higher" layers. So that 
one can always argue by appeal to a higher layer-to some more 
ultimate (alleged) precept or precepts of American political mo-
rality, for which the Constitution stands and which accordingly 
carry the force of law-in defense of some projected "transfor-
mation" of the lower, currently operative legal layer. 
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We would find ourselves, then, with an account of the argu-
ment for the "human life" amendment-call it the "amendment 
under law" account-running roughly as follows: 
"Right now, in the post-Casey moment, we have in force an 
operative layer of constitutional law containing, as one compo-
nent, a measure of protection for the procreative freedoms of 
pregnant women. Such is the higher law that right now binds 
and obligates the subordinate official agents of the sovereign 
People, judges of course included. But there is also right now 
awaiting recognition [so would run this account] a higher, 
more ultimate layer of constitutional principle that, if recog-
nized, would warrant a contrary legal conclusion. This higher 
layer of constitutional principle is itself cognizable as binding 
law. It is, however, thus cognizable only by one court, the 
court of the People acting by way of constitutional amend-
ment. Pending such a cognition by the People, the currently 
operative layer of constitutional law continues in force." 
This sort of multi-legal-layer account would provide a way to 
begin to make sense of the notion of a (fidelity-inspired) legal 
argument or legal judgment, aiming at constitutional transforma-
tion. But whatever sense the account makes may prove fragile 
when we start to follow up in earnest its implications. 
For consider: However mistaken any of us might think the 
judgment-of-higher-principle that formal adoption of a human 
life amendment would represent (on the always-under-law ac-
count), no more than a tiny handful of us would dream of deny-
ing that this action lies within the subject-matter jurisdiction, so 
to speak, of the People acting under Article V. Yet among those 
of us who would thus freely concede this jurisdiction to the Peo-
ple, a sizeable fraction would also join the Casey plurality in de-
nying it henceforth to the Supreme Court. How would we, then, 
explain ourselves? If there is some respect in which the People, 
acting within their rightful jurisdiction, can renovate constitu-
tional essentials, and a parallel authorization is denied to judges 
sworn to uphold the Constitution, then that seems to undermine 
the suggestion that the People's higher lawmaking actions areal-
ways ideally meant to be products of judgments governed by up-
per-layer constitutional principles. 
But maybe it doesn't. A constitutional system might, for 
various reasons, contain jurisdictional rules barring one or more 
classes of tribunals from pursuing the demands of law all the way 
up. Our system does contain such rules, most obviously its com-
monplace rules of intra-judicial hierarchy. Again to illustrate: 
Almost everyone would agree that there was a period of time 
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after 1973 when the Supreme Court quite properly held itself 
open to legal argument aimed at persuading it to put aside, to 
overrule, what it later came to call the central holding of Roe v. 
Wade,z9 but that there never was a time when any lower federal 
court could properly have entertained that possibility, independ-
ent of the Supreme Court's lead. This example suggests that 
there may be some way to extend our "always under law" ac-
count of higher lawmaking to make the account explain why 
some ministrations of upper-layer higher-law content are re-
served to a tribunal apart from the Supreme Court, that of the 
People themselves, while still construing what the People do, 
whenever they lay hands on the higher law, as the rendition of 
interpretative judgments. 
V. JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION 
Within the frame of an always-under-law account of higher 
lawmaking, what could possibly explain special jurisdictional res-
ervations to the People from professionally expert tribunals 
sworn to render judgment according to law? The likeliest an-
swer, I think, is practical doubts that interpretation of higher-law 
norms can always be held securely distinct from selection or 
identification of the norms themselves, or, in other words, practi-
cal doubts that acts of interpretation can always be held securely 
distinct from acts of legislation. 
Theory differentiates between acts of norm-origination and 
acts of norm-interpretation; theory differentiates between origi-
nary discourses of justification and secondary discourses of appli-
cation.3o If these theoretical differentiations were secure, and 
experienced as secure, in actual constitutional-democratic prac-
tice, then it would seem that the following would be a necessary 
and sufficient condition for popular sovereignty, for self-govern-
ment by the People of a country: The people "themselves" are the 
originators or the endorsers of all the norms composing the coun-
try's higher law. In order for popular self-government to exist or 
be the case, originary questions would have to be reserved to the 
People. By the same token, however, all questions of interpreta-
tion and application could be left to judicial or other subalterns 
without compromising popular sovereignty. 
29. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791 & passim. 
30. See, e.g., JUrgen Habennas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of 
Kont Apply to Discourse Ethics? in JUrgen Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Commu-
nicative Action 195, 206 (MIT Press, Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Nicholsen tr. 1990). 
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What's striking about the account herein of the popular-sov-
ereignty component in constitutional-democratic political 
thought is that it doesn't at all play in that way. On the one 
hand, according to this account, the People are not envisioned as 
ever originating norms;3t the extension to the case of popular 
higher-lawmaking of the always-under-law thesis says that the 
People's higher-law ministrations are always interpretative, 
never originary. On the other hand, according to this account, 
the People's self-government is perceived as compromised when 
subordinate officers Qudges) are allowed to enter certain reaches 
of norm-interpretation; jurisdiction in these reaches is reserved 
to the People. It seems, then, that this account implies a rela-
tivization-or perhaps a denial of the significance or 
detectability in practice-of the origination/interpretation and 
justification/application distinctions that theory posits. 
31. Although, it must be conceded, all nonns are envisioned as having originated 
with the People. 
